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RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE MUTUAL FUND
NATHAN D. LOBELLt
IN recent months several significant decisions involving shareholders' rights
in mutual funds have been rendered,1 and the large number of currently pend-
ing actions by shareholders of mutual funds will afford more decisions in the
immediate future.2 The opinions issued thus far show little sign that the courts
have been given an understanding of the nature of the institution with which
they are dealing or of the consequences of their decisions to that institu-
tion.3 Since fund assets now stand at $20 billion, owned in 5 million
accounts,4 these consequences can be far reaching indeed.
An inquiry into mutual fund shareholders' rights is by its nature an inquiry
into the duties correlative to those rights. This article will deal principally
with the correlative duties of fund directors.5 In a previous article the author
referred to the duties of mutual fund directors as "one of the shadowlands"
of mutual fund law.6 As we penetrate the shadowland we will find that mutual
tMember, New York Bar. Former Executive Adviser to the SEC.
1. Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Brown v. Bullock,
Civil No. 60-3106, S.D.N.Y., March 9, 1961; Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F.
Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960); Meiselman v. Eberstadt, Civil No. 1345, Del. Ch., May 4,
1961.
2. It was estimated recently by the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange
Commission that fifty-two fund shareholder actions are now pending in various state and
federal courts. See Transcript of Oral Argument, April 7, 1961, p. 101A, Brown v. Bul-
lock, supra note 1. Despite incidental differences, an essential element of complaint in all
of these pending actions is the fee of advisers serving funds under contract. Of the three
major decisions noted herein, only the Brown and Meiselman cases deal directly with this is-
sue. The Taussig case involved the right of shareholders to complain of an adviser who creat-
ed a new fund with a name similar to that of the fund whose shares were held by the com-
plaining shareholder. The Brouk case involved a complaint about various alleged malprac-
tices of an adviser in the operation of the fund. All the cases involve questions as to
the scope of the duties of fund directors.
3. It is the author's view that in attempting to define the scope of responsibility of
directors the courts have uttered ratio decidendi which, if taken seriously, would destroy
the continuity of investment policy expected by shareholders, as in Taussig v. Wellington;
or immunize directors from even minimal responsibility for detecting and stopping an
adviser's malpractice, as in Brouk v. Managed Funds; or substitute the director and the
court for the shareholder in matters of judgment uniquely within the shareholder's prov-
ince, as in Brown v. Bullock and Meiselman v. Eberstadt.
4. The actual number of shareholders, as distinguished from shareholder accounts,
is estimated at about 3 million by the National Association of Investment Companies.
5. So far, the problems that have arisen in litigation relate almost exclusively to a
particular aspect of directors' responsibilities, i.e., as overseers of the adviser. In view of
the fact that investing is the main business of the mutual fund and is the adviser's prime
responsibility under his contract with the fund, the likelihood is that this aspect of direc-
tors' responsibilities will continue to dominate judicial attention.
6. Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REV. 181, 188 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Lobell].
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fund shareholders, directors and advisers 7 are a triad whose interrelations are
the fabric of the fund as an operating institution and whose relative rights
and duties must be determined in the light of what these people do and do
not do, can and can not do, may or may not legitimately expect of each other.
A lawyer researching a case involving the liabilities of directors of an ordin-
ary business corporation may scan through the precedents involving other
ordinary companies, confident that law for the directors of one company is
law for the directors of the others. It is the thesis of this article that if the
law of ordinary business corporations is indiscriminately applied to mutual
funds, the result might be a distorted caricature of good sense and justice.
Why is this so? Perhaps the best way of approaching an answer is to
appraise the mutual fund as a social fact and to understand it as a nexus of
social forces.
The Background of the Mutual Fund
A society which creates abundant savings is in need of methods by which
such savings may be fruitfully employed. The modern mutual fund is designed
as a response to that need. Some funds originated as natural extensions of
private advisory services ;s some were the creation of people who early sensed
the power, timeliness and salability of the fund idea and invested many years
and dollars to promote it.9 But the desire to make money for their share-
holders and themselves was a common attribute of all these men and the
emergence of a new social phenomenon was one of the results of their efforts.
To early fund founders it seemed natural to include in their constituent
documents the kinds of restrictions on management which rendered these new
7. Variously referred to in fund affairs as the "management company" or "sponsor-
manager" or "sponsor-adviser," the reference here is to the "investment adviser" as defined
in § 2(a) (19) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 793 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2(a) (19) (1958). This is the person or company "who pursuant to contract ...
regularly furnishes advice. with respect to the desirability of investing in, purchasing
or selling securities . . .or is empowered to determine what securities ... shall be pur-
chased or sold .... 1" Ibid.
8. See Testimony of Charles Eaton, Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Part I, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 600 (1940).
9. "Answer. From my experience I came to the conclusion that an investor needed
three things in his economic life. I felt in order of importance he probably needed insur-
ance first; second, he needed a reasonable rainy day bank account; and I felt the savings
banks we had in this country provided the first and our insurance company provided the
second, or perhaps vice versa. When a man had gotten to a point in life where he could
become an investor there was really no sound investment medium available for him; the
best he could do was to buy an individual stock or individual bond, and it did not work
very well. In some of my studies the English investment trust had been called to my at-
tention. I found the investor would invariably buy the wrong stock because he wanted a
high yield. I came to the conclusion that that was unsound. So it was a question of provid-
ing a medium for the investor. I believed it could grow into a tremendously large business,
because if you were going to ask the average individual the simple question: 'What can
I do for you?' that you would more than anything else be convinced that he would prob-
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combined accounts analogous to the traditional client-adviser relation '10-for,
as they saw it, they were doing no more (or less) than making mass service
possible by adapting tradition to modem needs."
Despite its size and the large and growing variety of shareholder services,
such as systematic accumulation and withdrawal plans, plan insurance and
automatic reinvestments of distributions, the mutual fund remains, in essence,
the means of extending services that could not be provided as broadly on a
private basis without great difficulty and expense.
It is this history which explains a phenomenon common to almost all funds
but not prevalent elsewhere-the advisory contract. This is analogous to the
individual service arrangement which a private adviser makes with each client.
In the context of the fund the creation and termination of this arrangement
is approximated by the purchase and redemption of fund shares. As an at-
tribute of fund structure, the contract was so deeply ingrained by history and
tradition that the Investment Company Act of 1940 ' 2-- designed as the major
federal compendium of fund regulation-assumes the contract as the means by
which a fund is served by its adviser and requires the contract to conform to
a prescribed pattern in terms of the method of its adoption and cancellation,
its duration, and certain other aspects. 13 Another example of this tendency in
the modem fund is the practice of having the adviser bear many of the costs
of operating the fund. This helps to alleviate the burden of the fund, as a
separate entity, on the shareholder, thus approximating the relationship be-
tween the private investment adviser and his client.
The Fund Shareholder
We know that in 1958 a typical holder of fund shares in a regular account
was somewhat above 50 years of age, held fund shares valued at over $4,000,
ably answer, 'Help me to get somewhere financially.' So it seemed to me I had at least
a very large potential market. Out of that grew the idea of the Massachusetts Investors
Trust.
"Question. How long did it take you before you could get anybody interested?
"Answer. Three or four years.
"Question. Then who picked up the idea?
"Answer. Learoyd, Foster & Co.
"Question. As a result of that the Massachusetts Investors Trust was formed? Is that
right?
"Answer. That is right."
This is the testimony of Edward Leffler, one of the organizers of the oldest and largest
mutual fund in the country. Quoted in SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COM-
PANxIES, PART ONE 102 (1940).
10. See, e.g., Testimony of Charles Eaton, Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 8, at 595-
604.
11. Ibid.
12. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1958).
13. Section 15, Investment Company Act of 1940. See discussion beginning at note 75
infra and accompanying text.
1260 [Vol. 70 :1258
MUTUAL FUNDS
owned over $8,000 of general market securities, had a bond and savings bank
account of close to $3,500 and somewhat less than $10,000 of insurance. He
was inclined to hold fund shares in more than one fund-apparently apportion-
ing his fund investments according to an appraisal of his own objectives. In a
group of 100 of these shareholders about 30 were likely to be women and 70
men-and of those men about 45 were likely to be professionals or in execu-
tive-administrative positions.
1 4
We do not know how many of these people explored means of retaining
full-time professional investment supervision other than through mutual funds.
Nor do we know how many of them read the prospectus and other information
available to them before investing. We can be sure that most of them were
"sold" by a fund share dealer's representative with techniques of "prospect
development" originating in the insurance field and adapted to fund selling.
At the same time we do know that if Mr. Smith, a hypothetical share-
holder, had taken the pains to explore the alternatives, and had made his fund
investment as a result, he may well have had approximately the following
experience: With $10,000 to invest in common stocks, Mr. Smith believed
that prudent investing calls for care in the selection of stocks, for diversifica-
tion and for alert watchfulness over one's holdings in changing times. Unable
to fill these needs himself he decided to turn his $10,000 account over to a
professional. Several investment firms refused to assume full-time supervision
of his small account, others fixed fees which would absorb a large portion of
his expected investment income. All advised him that the account was too
small to afford wide diversification except in low-priced speculations. One of
the firms he consulted was an investment banking house which was also in-
vestment adviser to a mutual fund.'5 He discovered that by purchasing the
fund's shares 16 he could benefit from the full time investment management
14. National Ass'n of Investment Companies, "The Mutual Fund Shareholder," 1958.
15. Various traditional banking houses such as Lehman Brothers, Lazard Freres &
Co., Coffin & Burr, Inc., Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., F. Eberstadt & Co., are founders
and advisers of mutual funds. Some funds were founded and are served as advisers by
houses specializing in investment counselling-such as Eaton & Howard, Inc. and Scudder,
Stevens & Clark. Others are served by advisers who have undertaken to specialize com-
pletely in fund management. Edgar Lawrence Smith, a New York analyst, whose CoMmoN
STOCKS As LONG TERM INVESTMENTS, published in 1924, was the fountainhead of the new
view of common stocks as an essential element of prudently managed portfolios, formed
Investment Management Company in 1924 with a group of co-sponsors for the specific pur-
pose of putting his philosophy to practical use through mutual fund management. Funda-
mental Investors, Inc., a $600 million common-stock fund is still managed by a successor
to Investment Management Company under the chairmanship of a member of the original
founding group.
16. The purchase may involve the payment of a sales charge. A relatively small num-
ber of funds distribute their shares without sales charge. Others use "principal under-
writers" serving under contract with the fund, and their shares are sold wvith sales charges
up to 83A% on small lump-sum purchases and 9% on installment plan purchases. Cf. Sec-
tion 15(b), Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(b)
(1958).
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service rendered to the fund by the adviser at a fee cost to himself of half or
less than half of that charged for private counselling.'7 In addition he would
have an interest in a much more widely diversified investment portfolio than
he could afford in his single account. 18 He could, as could any private client
of the house, terminate its service at any time-in his case by having his
shares redeemed for their current value in cash and without charge.19
Mr. Smith was given a prospectus which described the investment objec-
tives of the fund, its security holdings, the performance of the investment
adviser in management of the fund over past years, the adviser's fee, and other
information. As a shareholder of the fund Mr. Smith receives periodic reports
of performance 20 and has available to him quotations on his shares published
in daily newspapers.
21
Apart from obedience to basic standards of honesty in handling and full
accounting for his money by the fund management, Mr. Smith expects the
same level of skill and degree of care to go into the supervision of his fund
account as he would if his account were privately managed. He expects a con-
tinuity of service from the adviser whom he chose to manage his account
through the fund. He would not want to wake one morning and find his money
in the hands of a stranger. He expects a continuity of policy in fund manage-
ment-no radical changes in the degree of risk he assumed when he bought
the shares-just as he would expect a private adviser to continue following
an instructed policy of risk taking.
22
17. While there is a wide variety of charges (and types of charge) for private coun-
selling, recent plans for private management of small accounts (up to $25,000) call for fees
of as high as 2% of assets in the account. This is four times higher than the usual Y2 of
1% advisory charge called for in fund advisory contracts. See, e.g., Plan of Danforth Asso-
ciates, N.Y. Times, March 26, 1961, § 3 (financial), p. F7, col. 5.
18. Shares selling at $50 per share and traded in 100 share round lots permit only 2
issues to be held in a $10,000 portfolio without involving the extra brokerage for odd-lot
purchases and sales. The typical mutual fund holds anywhere from 60 to over 100 stocks.
19. A very few funds impose a small "redemption fee." Most have no redemption fee.
It should be noted that the redemption for cash of a fund share is, for tax purposes, a
"realization" which involves capital gain or loss tax consequences.
20. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 30, 54 Stat. 838 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
30 (1958), and SEC Rules 30a-1 to 30f-2, 17 L.F.R. §§ 270.30a-1 to 270.30f-2 (1949).
21. Quotations are frequently stated as "bid" and "asked" prices. The "bid" price is
the actual asset value, the amount available on redemption where no redemption fee is
involved. The "asked" price is the "bid" price plus the sales charge. These prices, for the
purpose of sale and redemption, are calculated by funds twice each business day. For a
discussion of the background of the twice-a-day pricing practice, see Greene, The Uniform
Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 37
U. DEr. LJ. 369 (1960).
22. Mr. Smith is far more typical than many observers tend to believe. The number
of fund accounts held by trustees, institutions, business organizations and other substantial
and sophisticated investors has increased continually and as of the last quarter of 1960 stood
at approximately 220,000 (as against 165,000 in the prior year). In recent years, impelled
in large part by tax considerations, owners of private holding companies have merged
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The Conceptual Models
The aggregate of Mr. Smith's expectations and understandings is embodied
in the simple formula of stewardship between himself and the adviser he chose
for the management of his money through the fund. If that understanding is
typical of the fund investor, then the fund is truly the matrix of two social
drives (of the founder adviser and of the shareholder) expressing themselves
in a relation that the law classically recognizes as that of a trust.
Mr. Smith's fund, like most others, happens to be a corporation.23 It has
a ten-man board of directors of which four members are affiliated with the
advisory house-the founder of the fund.2 The adviser serves under a con-
tract with the fund, a contract which has been renewed each year by the board
of directors or by shareholders since the fund's formation.2 5 However, not
all funds are corporations. And of those which are trusts some do not have
boards of trustees.2 6 To Mr. Smith it makes little difference what form the
fund takes and he would be surprised to hear that his rights are enhanced or
diminished depending on whether the fund is or is not a corporation, or does
or does not have a board. In any case, since the adviser may serve the fund
only under a written contract,27 it is obvious that while the fund is the nexus
of the relation of stewardship between the adviser and the shareholder, the
advisory contract is its life-line.
them with mutual funds in tax-free reorganizations. Single fund accounts of as large as
$3 million each have been so created. It may be taken for granted that these and many
smaller account holders investigated carefully before investing in a particular fund. How-
ever, even the less careful holder who knows of the fund only by its name, its objectives
and performance record assumes a continuity of the adviser and his policy when he selects
the fund's shares. The source of much erroneous thinking about funds is the failure to
comprehend that what masquerades as an appeal to "high standards" of fund management
may be no more than an improper assumption that an investor's choice is a random exer-
cise of ignorance and that it should give way to a paternalistically determined alternative
choice "better" for the investor than the one he made himself. This is in direct contrast
with the philosophy of disclosure which respects the investor's freedom of choice and at-
tempts to make his decision an informed act of will.
23. The majority of mutual funds are corporations.
24. Representation of the adviser is limited to four out of ten members of a fund's board
of directors or trustees whenever the adviser is, or is affiliated with, the fund's principal
underwriter. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10, 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
10 (1958).
25. No fund contract may provide for a duration beyond two years. It may be renewed
annually either by approval of shareholders as a class or by directors, including a majority
of those not affiliated with the adviser. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15, 54 Stat. 812
(1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1958). Traditionally, fund advisory contracts are renewed
annually.
26. Trustees are considered "directors" under the federal statute. Investment Company
Act of 1940 § 2(a) (12), 54 Stat. 792 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (12) (1958).
27. Section 15(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-15 (a) (1958). The basic requirements of the contract are discussed beginning
at note 75 infra and accompanying text.
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Thus one might conceive of the relation of a private investment counsellor
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It will be noted that the conceptual model of the typical corporation, in-
ternally managed, involves a direct line of relationship between the share-
holders and directors. In this relationship the total range of enforceable ex-
pectations and understandings of the shareholder, as such, is presumably re-
flected in a corresponding set of functions and duties of directors. Directors
of the typical corporation are plenipotentiaries in corporate management-
whether the directors perform functions alone or delegate those functions to
others.28 -
28. In one sense, directors' powers are "original," "received" from the state in the act
of incorporation. However one views the source of directors' power, the beneficiaries of its
exercise, and those empowered to pursue remedies against them, are the shareholders.
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In the simple model of the private client-investment counsellor relationship
and in that of the fund with no board there is obviously no place for a board
of directors. It is to the adviser that the investor looks for the management
of his money and the total range of enforceable expectations and understand-
ings in the arrangement is presumably matched by corresponding responsi-
bilities and duties of the adviser.
However, in the corporate mutual fund (or in the fund in trust form which
has a board of trustees) served by an adviser under contract the directors do
appear at the apex of the relationship. What are their responsibilities? Is
there any warrant for believing that they are of a different scope or level from
those of the typical corporate director? In exploring this question we will refer
to basic doctrine and to unique provisions of statutory law applicable to mutual
funds. But the perspective of our Mr. Smith provides the common sense
approach. In his view responsibilities of directors are neither so broad as to
belie his understanding that it was to the adviser that he was entrusting the
management of his account, nor so narrow as to make the directors in fact
rubber stamps or dummies.
The truth is somewhere in between. To define it with more precision, con-
sistently with the pattern of legislation affecting funds, and with the rational
administration of funds, requires us to look not merely to the law of directors'
liability but to the ethical predicates behind it. Should Miss Marilyn Monroe
raise public capital for new productions by forming the M.M. Corporation
and issuing its shares publicly, the heart of such a venture would be the cor-
poration's contract with Miss Monroe. Whatever other functions one might
predicate in the directors of this type of corporation they do not embrace a
freedom to fire Miss Monroe because Gloria Gorgeous is willing to serve for
a smaller percentage, or because Miss Monroe refuses to dicker with the di-
rectors for a percentage of profits lower than that fixed in her contract and
disclosed to and accepted by every participating shareholder.29 On the other
hand, there is just as little doubt that the directors do have an obligation to
see to it that Miss Monroe obeys faithfully the terms of her contract-as, for
example, making the number of films specified within the times specified. In
reaching these conclusions one works from the sense and meaning of the re-
lationship to judgments about its attributes-not from any predetermined set
of ideas derived from the form in which the relationships are cast.
In the same sense the reader will have realized that the conceptual models
illustrated above, if they justify differences in the scope or level of duties, must
29. If these problems were litigated there would seem to be no reason for reaching
different conclusions even if it were proved that, for some reason or other, Miss Monroe
"dominated" the board or that the board members were in "collusion" with her. Cf. the
discussion of Brown v. Bullock beginning at note 85 infra and accompanying text. The
problem of what fund directors may or may not do in respect of the advisory contract arises
in fund litigation partly because, as we shall note, the statute gives directors the power to
veto a renewal of, or to cancel, an advisory contract without specifying the standards on
which such action should be based.
1265
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
assume a legal predicate broad enough to yield each model as a special case
of the general truth. This basis was classically stated by Justice Earl as fol-
lows:
When one deposits money in a savings bank, or takes stock in a corpora-
tion, thus divesting himself of the immediate control of his property, he
expects and has the right to expect, that the trustees or directors, who
are chosen to take his place in the management and control of his prop-
erty, will exercise ordinary care and prudence in the trusts committed to
them.... Like a mandatary, to whom he [the director or trustee] has
been likened, he is bound, not only to exercise proper care and diligence,
but ordinary skill and judgment.30
Justice Earl deals here with both the ethical basis and the legal levels of
directors' duties. Later opinions have couched their descriptions of the level
of duties in more exacting terms,31 but none has, or indeed could, change the
ethical basis for predication of duties in an "open" society.32 The ethically
operative elements of the quoted statement are:
a. legitimate expectations arising from the
b. choosing and mandating of another to take the settlor's place in the
c. control of property of whose immediate control the settlor
d. divests himself.33
Describing the triggers that release fiduciary duties in almost any context
involving freedom of a creator of a trust to choose his mandatary and to deter-
mine the scope of the mandate, the doctrine is broad enough to yield meaning-
ful conclusions in specific applications to the models we have illustrated.
34 If
30. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71, 73-74 (1880).
31. See, e.g., the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311
(1939).
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his cestuis
second... He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment
of the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms that power may
be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that
power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be exercised
for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion
or detriment of the cestus.
32. By the term "open society" we intend to designate one whose basic assumption is
equality of status, which attempts through equitable rules to define the rights and duties of
people in their contractual arrangements according to their intent, and which strikes down
private arrangements only where obvious public policy demands it (such as contracts for
white slavery) or where the assumed equality of status and bargaining power does not in
fact exist (e.g., contracts with minors or with the insane, or unilateral mistakes of fact
induced by misrepresentation). In contradistinction to the "open" society is the "closed"
society, such as feudalism, where birth or the assumption of a status naturally carries with
it rights and duties transcending individual bargains.
33. While not explicitly stated, it is assumed that the "mandatary" has undertaken the
functions and thereby the responsibility of control.
34. In the private client-counsellor relationship the range of duties of the counsellor
may extend far beyond the specific terms of the contract, and certain exculpatory provisions
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one is, therefore, to list a set of duties for which any fiduciary, including a
mutual fund director, is chargeable, one must find a root for these duties in
the doctrine.
A basic distinction is immediately apparent between those elements of a
relationship as to which the creator of the trust exercises freedom of choice
(and corresponding responsibility) and those elements as to which responsi-
bility is vested in the trustee. Thus a private client who instructs his invest-
ment counsellor to maintain a low level of risk cannot be heard to complain
of a low level of capital gain. A shareholder who purchases a fixed dividend
preferred stock in a corporation cannot be heard to claim that the directors
should declare a higher preferred dividend on the ground that they personally
own common stock and are benefiting from high earnings. The settlor of a
trust estate cannot be heard to complain of the fee he agreed to pay for man-
agement. The holder of a bank account cannot sue for added interest on the
ground that the bank earns a surplus profit from the use of his money. In
each of these cases a trust relation of some kind is established. But in all cases
the creator of the trust himself has chosen or accepted terms of the relation-
ship which are inconsistent with the responsibility he alleges. The limits of
the mandate set the limits of the duties which may be derived from the man-
date.
Similarly, the purchase of a mutual fund share involves certain choices
which are within the ambit of freedom-and hence responsibility-of the in-
vestor. In the nature of things, he does not fix these terms by individual
arrangement, but accepts or rejects them as elements of the type and terms of
of the contract may, under the doctrine of Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), be dis-
regarded in fixing the range of responsibilities. A parallel to that doctrine applicable to the
mutual fund may be found in § 17(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat.
817 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (1958) which provides:
After one year from the effective date of this subchapter, neither the charter, cer-
tificate of incorporation, articles of association, indenture of trust, nor the by-laws
of any registered investment company, nor any other instrument pursuant to which
such a company is organized or administered, shall contain any provision which
protects or purports to protect any director or officer of such company against any
liability to the company or to its security holders to which he would otherwise be
subject by reason of willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless dis-
regard of the duties involved in the conduct of his office.
Section 17(i) contains identical provisions applicable to investment advisers. In the typical
corporate relationship the law follows custom in deeming the directors to be plenipoten-
tiaries in all matters not reserved for freedom of choice of the owners. As we shall observe,
certain aspects of the stockholder's relation to the company are within his own choice, not
creating corresponding duties in others. And the corporation may be of a type like the
M.M. Corp. referred to in the text supra where, by nature of the enterprise, certain func-
tions normally associated with the typical corporate director cannot be assumed without
destroying the sense of the relationship. This is the case in the mutual fund. In the fund
situation the law still has to build a set of precedents which clearly separate the mandated
from unmandated responsibilities and set the levels applicable to the various mandated
duties.
126719611
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
service offered to him in the offering of the fund's shares. These "terms" of
the relationship-the aspects of the fund preexisting the purchase of the shares,
disclosed in the prospectus and presumably accepted and assented to by the
purchasing shareholder-include, in part :
1. the identity of the adviser,36
2. the fee of the advisera3
3. the stated investment objective of the fund and the degree of risk taken
to achieve that objective,88 and
4. the terms and conditions, if any, of his redemption rights.80
Each of these aspects of the fund, required to be disclosed in the prospectus,
is one which should enter into the total act of decision by the shareholder to
purchase or not to purchase the shares initially. It is one of the aims of this
article to demonstrate that the prime purpose of the disclosure requirements
of federal law applicable to mutual funds is to inform the investor of these
facts, among others, so that his purchase can reflect "an... informed act of
mature will." 40 It would seem beyond doubt that no shareholder of a fund has
standing to complain of any of these disclosed and accepted elements of the
35. The prospectus is required to contain many items of disclosure in addition to those
listed here. Some of these are, by terms of the arrangement, subject to change, such as the
portfolio itself. However, since the prospectus gives the fund's acquisition cost of each hold-
ing in the portfolio, it reveals the unrealized gains inherent in the portfolio and, in that
sense, informs the investor of the capital gains distributions (in effect taxable returns of
capital) to which he is subject. Thus the unrealized capital gain position of the fund be-
comes one of the accepted terms on which the investor makes his share purchase. See
Schedule A of Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 88 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1958).
36. The prospectus is required to set forth not only the name but the management
make-up of the adviser. In describing the policy, performance and risk level of the fund it
describes, in fact, the character and history of the adviser's service.
37. Summary of Management Fees-249 Mutual Funds*
Rate of anual fee Funds Total Assets
(as % of net assets) No. % In Millions 0
Greater than '/ of 1% 67 26.9% $1,766.2 10.6%
r/2of 1% 145 58.2 8,610.0 52.0
Less than 3/2 of 1% 37 14.9 6,191.4 37.4
249 100.0% $16,567.6 100.0%
* Rates and assets as of June 30, 1960.
Source: Analysis of various prospecti.
38. While many funds may state their investment objectives in similar language, the
actual degree of risk taken to achieve the objective may vary considerably and be discern-
ible only by inspection of the portfolio-.e., the nature of the stocks held and the relative
amount of cash or cash equivalents or bonds retained in the portfolio.
39. Funds do not, as a matter of custom, make shareholders wait for cash on redemp-
tion. However, the power to do so to cover emergencies is often retained and that fact is
disclosed in prospecti. If a redemption fee is charged (which is done in a small minority




fund predating his purchase and unchanged (in terms or in material signifi-
cance due to change in circumstances) since his acquisition of the shares.
41
However, our hypothetical Mr. Smith's inability to find private means, at
an economical fee cost, of full-time professional management and broad diver-
sification, led him to purchase his fund shares. Rooted in his expectations and
understanding was the assumption that the fund shares were a means of ob-
taining these advantages. He, himself, chose the adviser who would do the
managing, selected the fund for its stated policy and the risk level apparent
in its portfolio and accepted the disclosed advisory fee and other terms fixed
in the fund's contract with the chosen adviser. By having made the choice,
he divested himself of control of his money and mandated the use of it in the
hope of return through a fund investment account. Until he elects to terminate
the account through redemption, control of these operational aspects of the
fund is in others than himself. With that control go mandated functions and
responsibilities, squarely within his legitimate expectations. These include:
1. a professional level of competence in buying and selling investment
holdings in pursuit of the fund's policy;
2. a strict accounting for every penny of capital, capital gains and income;
3. the responsibility created by traditions of equity and by statute to avoid
unfair advantage to fund insiders at the expense of the investor; and
4. such additional responsibilities (for instance, keeping the investor in-
formed of the progress of the fund) as are prescribed by statute.4
In several of the decisions to be discussed the issue before the courts has
involved, in one form or another, the duties of fund directors with respect to
advisory fees. Whether favorable or adverse to directors, a common charac-
teristic of these decisions is that they assume the fiduciary character of the
relations focussed in the fund but skip the preliminary step of allocating rights
and duties as we have here tried to do. Instead, the courts have tended to reach
into the bin of concepts developed in cases involving the typical corporation
and to proceed directly to apply garden-variety law to the question of direc-
tors' responsibility for management compensation.
Is this skipping of the allocation problem warranted? A court which had
before it the legitimacy of a complaint by a shareholder in the M.M. Corpora-
tion 43 that Miss Monroe's percentage was too high and that directors were
41. What constitutes a change of situation of sufficient scope to create a duty to change
a "term" aspect of a fund is a question that has to the author's knowledge so far not been
judicially decided. In any but the most extreme market crises it would seem that the fund
management has neither freedom nor responsibility to make a drastic change in fund in-
vestment policy. If a crisis is urgent enough it is, in the author's opinion, within the range
of management's freedom to change policy, even without the shareholder approval required
in § 13 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 811, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1958)
as a condition of change of fundamental policy. Whether a duty exists to do so would
depend on many more factors than can be previsioned here.
42. See note 20 supra.
43. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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remiss for not substituting Gloria Gorgeous would not hesitate to point out
that to denote a defendant as a director is but to begin an inquiry into his
responsibilities in a particular case. If a bank depositor were suing a bank
because its profits bore an unreasonably high relation to the interest it paid,
the court would be equally quick to point out that denoting a defendant as a
fiduciary merely initiates the inquiry into his specific responsibilities.
In the mutual fund situation failure to distinguish between mandated and
unmandated responsibilities may result in vesting in directors a perennial (and
potentially very costly) duty to review the total arrangement accepted by the
shareholder when he purchased his shares-regardless of its reasonableness to
or desirability for the shareholders as individuals and regardless of their ac-
ceptance of the arrangement with full disclosure thereof available to them. If
every shareholder were a Mr. Smith, such a transfer of responsibility from
fund shareholder to fund director would be shocking. Is it any less shocking
because there is among shareholders a hypothetical Mr. Jones who did not
avail himself of the information afforded? In this author's opinion, to key the
law to Mr. Jones as against Mr. Smith is to rip out of the structure of our
regulatory scheme its underpinning of disclosure and to confess defeat in the
hard campaign against ignorance and cupidity and for the development of the
mature investor.
But one need not reach so far to justify the allocation of responsibilities in
the mutual fund-whatever its form and however one approaches it. Know-
ingly or otherwise, what the fund investor buys is an interest in a portfolio
built by a specific management and supervised by it according to the stated
policy and on specified terms of service. It is the materiality of these facts that
endows their disclosure with materiality. The position Mr. Smith reached
articulately Mr. Jones also occupies, even though he may not know how he
got there. It is essential to the integrity of Mr. Jones' position, as it is to Mr.
Smith's, that the clear division between mandated and unmandated responsi-
bilities be recognized. If it is not, there is no conceptual warrant for not shift-
ing to the fund management complex every responsibility (including that of
revising investment objectives which may be vital to investors although tech-
nically not "fundamental").44 One might then legitimately ask not only what
has happened to the elaborate structure of disclosure requirements applying
to the fund institution as we have known it, but what has happened to the
institution itself.
At stake in the basic conflict between the philosophies of disclosure and
paternalism is more than a power struggle between elements of the fund.
Disclosure, as a philosophy of regulation, not only emphasizes the in-
44. Under § 13 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 certain changes in funds can-
not be made without approval of shareholders voting as a class, 54 Stat. 811 (1940), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1958). Among them is a change in "fundamental" policy. To be included
in this ban, however, the policy must be stated in the fund's registration statement under
the Investment Company Act to be "fundamental." Few funds "freeze" their traditional
risk levels by stating them as fundamental. Ibid.
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vestor's responsibilities but creates both a means conducive to the best pro-
tection of the investor-self-protection through knowledge-and a public
capable of demanding and through its patronage getting good value in its fund
investments.
The "Political" Aspect
The burden on the investor to select carefully his fund investment exists in
fact. No amount of intellectual manipulation can eradicate it. Once the in-
vestor makes his selection both law, as hitherto understood, and practice have
combined to preserve its integrity. That he does not always choose the best
fund, the best car, the best refrigerator or the best doctor should not condemn
those who make and serve. It should prompt us to keep working at the hard
task of informing and educating.
Attacks on advisory fees are often impelled by the raw feeling that some-
body is making too much money and are justified by a dialectic designed to
transform that feeling into law and practice via the courts. As we shall see,
the drafters of the Investment Company Act thought deeply about many of
the problems discussed here. The statute is carefully designed to preserve and
enhance the service potentials of some aspects of the funds as the framers of
the Act found them and to ban others. Various alternatives were considered
and rejected by the drafters and Congress. For example, Section 205 (1) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 outlaws fees which compensate the adviser
"on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of" a
client's funds.45 One justification for this prohibition is that sharing in gains
may stimulate flashy management which enriches the adviser on gains without
taxing him for losses.&4 6
Critics of advisory fees sometimes point out that times have changed since
1940 when the Investment Company Act was passed. The mutual fund is no
longer a $450 million segment of a total $1 billion industry (open plus
closed end investment companies) as it was then. The total industry has in-
creased more than 20 fold since then, and the vast bulk of it is in mutual
funds.4 7 By a rule of transformation of quantity into quality the mutual fund
institution has, by this reasoning, been changed so that the practical wisdom
45. 54 Stat. 852, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(l) (1958).
46. Even if the attack on fees in current litigation were to raise the problem of select-
ing positive alternatives to replace presently employed fee systems, under our governmental
structure the legislature rather than the courts would seem the appropriate forum for
effectuating a change.
• * * I suggest that the federal courts are not apt instruments either for national
economic decisions, or for economic planning. They have neither mandate, method,
nor competence to lay down the bases on which such decisions or such planning
should proceed. Still less have they any business to assign themselves that function
by their own fiat.
Berle, Legal Problems of Economic Power, 60 COLUmr. L. REv. 4, 7 (1960).
47. Source: National Association of Investment Companies.
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in its evolution and in the basic legal concepts applicable to it until now are
no longer appropriate.
Intriguing as this reasoning is, it is misapplied here. The difference be-
tween a fender repair shop and General Motors is a vast difference in kind
as well as degree. But the difference between a small fund and a large one
is not. The large fund serves more people and, if it is economically run,
enables its sponsors to earn more money. But the plant and equipment are
still only tables, chairs and a library and the machine that produces the results
is still only human brains. Its impact on our society is still primarily in terms
of the spread of its service. As a storehouse of capital the modern mutual
fund grows in size without introducing a new power pool into our society.
Its sense of responsibility (neither greater nor less than that of the men who
manage it) is inwardly oriented, toward its shareholders, not outward toward
social power.
48
To summarize: a necessary preliminary step in appraising a fund share-
holder's assertion of responsibilities in the mutual fund is to allocate those
responsibilities. Behind any such allocation must lie a clear conception of what
functions are and are not mandated by the shareholder. This conception must
stem from the root ideas of fiduciary responsibility in our society. As do the
other models, the fund model calls for a division between disclosed and ac-
cepted pre-existing "term of relationship" aspects of funds (which do not
involve mandated responsibilities) and certain operational aspects of funds
(which do involve mandated responsibilities). Thus one may rephrase the doc-
trine specifically for the mutual fund situation as follows: What the fund
shareholder cannot do and cannot be expected to do or decide for himself is
prima facie a mandated responsibility for breach of which liability may exist.
What the fund shareholder can and should do for himself is prima facie an
unmandated responsibility which does not create duties in others.
THE ImPACT op STATUTE
So far we have but touched the threshold of the problem of directors'
responsibilities; for while we have attempted to delineate broadly the areas in
which a shareholder should or should not have standing to complain of alleged
wrongs, we have not yet indicated when, if the claim can be heard, responsi-
bility can be placed on the directors in addition to or to the exclusion of the
adviser or others. And so far we have been deriving conclusions from the
ethical underpinnings of the common law. How do the Investment Company
Act of 1940 and related statutes affect these problems? Most relevant are the
prospectus requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 49 and the provisions
48. See Statement of Dorsey Richardson before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, March 16, 1955-available in pamphlet form from National Association of
Investment Companies.
49. 48 Stat. 75, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (35) (1958), defining the term "prospectus";
Section 5(b), requiring the use of prospecti; 48 Stat. 81, 15 U.S.C. § 77(j) (1958) govern-
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of the Investment Company Act which require periodic reports,50 govern the
affiliation of directors r,' and subject both directors and advisers to prohibitions
against double dealing, 2 outright pilfering,5 or misconduct or abuse of trust
generally.5 4 Also of crucial importance are the requirements of the Investment
Company Act governing advisory contracts-both in terms of content and of
the mechanics of adoption and renewal. 55
Disclosure Requirements
Drafters of federal securities statutes had, and used, a vast array of legis-
lative patterns ranging from disclosure to flat prohibition.56 The statutes
applicable to mutual funds incorporate both patterns and a wide range in be-
tween. As perennial issuers of securities, funds are constant users of pro-
specti and are constantly subject to the requirement of the Securities Act of
1933 that the prospectus be, or that (with minor exceptions) it accompany,
the first written offer of securities. 57 The anti-fraud provisions of that Act 5
and of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 " are in effect controls over oral
representations (as well as written ones) made in the offering of fund shares
for sale. As we have noted, the Investment Company Act and rules thereunder
provide for frequent periodic disclosure of progress to shareholders. 0
As a philosophy of regulation, disclosure presupposes the materiality of the
matters disclosed to the investor in the making of investment decisions. Except
ing the information required to be contained in the prospectus. See Investment Company
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 826 (1940), as amended, 68 Stat. 689 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(d)
(1958) (removing fund securities from certain exemptions afforded by the Securities Act
of 1933); SEC Reg. C, Art. 2, 16 C.F.R. §§ 230.420-230.431 (1949) (covering form and
content of prospecti generally).
50. 54 Stat. 836 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(d) (1958) requires transmittal to share-
holders, at least semi-annually, of reports containing such information as the SEC shall
prescribe. The rules are contained in Rules 30a-ll to 30f-3 of the General Rules and Regu-
lations under the Investment Company Act. The SEC rules, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.30a-I to 270.30f
-3 (1949) (with certain qualifications) incorporate the requirement of the statute itself that
the following information be reported on: balance sheet, income, portfolio holdings, sur-
plus, remuneration to directors, officers and any affiliate of a director (which may
include the adviser), and amounts of purchases and sales of portfolio holdings.
51. 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1958).
52. 54 Stat. 815 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1958).
53. 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1958).
54. 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1958).
55. 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1958).
56. For an excellent short review of foreign and state precedents for federal securities
legislation see McCoRmicx, UNDERSTANDING THE SEcuarriEs Acr AND THE SEC 3-18
(1940). More extensive is the discussion in Loss & Cow=r, BLUE SKY LAw (1958).
57. See note 49 supra.
58. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 17, 48 Stat. 82, 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k, 1, q (1958).
59. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10 and 15, 48 Stat. 891, 895 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78o(c) (1958), and the rules of the SEC thereunder.
60. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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in rare instances, the act of disclosure forecloses any complaint about the
matters disclosed.61 Distinctions should, of course, be made between "fine
print" spillage of complex language beyond the capacity of the normal investor
to evaluate, and disclosures which are plain, obvious, and at the heart of the
relationship to be established. One of the constant endeavors of the Securities
and Exchange Commission in administration of disclosure requirements has
been to make disclosures plain and meaningful. 62 Anyone who has compared
a typical corporate prospectus with those used by mutual funds will recognize
that the latter have come close to achieving this result. One cannot read a
mutual fund prospectus, even hastily, without comprehending the essential
facts about the fund, its adviser, and the adviser's relation to the fund.
63
For protection against abuse in the operation of a fund, the investor must
look to others to carry out their responsibilities. In recognition of that fact
the Investment Company Act includes mutual fund officers, directors, advisers
and principal underwriters within the class of persons who may be enjoined
by the Securities and Exchange Commission from "gross misconduct" or
"gross abuse of trust."6" It makes theft, embezzlements or conversions by
anyone unlawful,6 5 outlaws double-dealing by insiders,66 and bans certain
exculpatory protections of directors and advisers.6 7 Finally it requires respon-
sible custodianship of assets,68 appropriate bonding of persons in certain sensi-
tive jobs, 69 and the exclusion of people with violation records from others,
70
61. One of the notable instances is § 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat.
896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1958), which requires disclosure of changes in equity
holdings by corporate insiders. Section 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1958), creates a civil liability for the return of profits made by insiders in certain short-
swing transactions. One of the purposes of requiring disclosure is, of course, to enable suits
to be brought under § 16(b). Disclosure under § 16(a) does not immunize from suit under
§ 16(b).
62. See McCoRMIcK, op. cit. supra note 56, at 152-59.
63. For example, the prospectus of Fundamental Investors, Inc. (April, 1960 ed.)
devotes more text space to a description of the adviser, Investors Management Company,
Inc., than to any other aspect of the Fund. The personnel, functions, advisory agreement,
the advisory fee, directors and technical consultants are described.
64. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36, 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35
(1958).
65. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 37, 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36
(1958).
66. Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 17(a), (d), (e), 54 Stat. 815, 816 (1940),
15-U.S.C. §§ 80a-17(a), (d), (e) (1958).
67. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17(h), 54 Stat. 817 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
17(h) (1958).
68. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17(f), 54 Stat. 816 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
17(f) (1958).
69. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17(g), 54 Stat. 816 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
17(g) (1958).




and provides that Commission approval must be sought before many important
transactions likely to affect shareholders may be effectuated.
71
For protection against terms that he may deem unsuited to his needs or
onerous, the investor must look to himself, aided by the information supplied
in the prospectus or other disclosures. The statutory pattern, in this sense,
assumes that the investor has, and should be given the opportunity to exercise
intelligently, the responsibility of choosing his fund investment,72 and recog-
nizes the existence of two separate areas of responsibility-that of the investor
to use the information supplied and that of the fund management to supply
the information and to live up to the expectations reasonably aroused by the
information. Indeed some of the largest houses distributing mutual fund shares
through so-called "contractual" plans voluntarily exceed the statutory re-
quirements of disclosure-requiring the investor to apply for his plan on
a form which sharply discloses elements of shareholder cost, sending him
a duplicate copy of his signed form, and telling him that he may, within
thirty days, receive a refund of his investment if the plan is not in accordance
with his understanding.
7 3
The Statutory Allocation of Functions and Duties
This pattern of division of responsibilities seems, so far, clearly envisioned
in the statute. But there are two elements of the Investment Company Act
which must be carefully inspected to see whether they change the pattern and,
if they do, to what extent. These critical elements are functions vested by the
Act in directors respecting the advisory contract and catch-all provisions of
the Act designed to prevent abuse of trust.
a. Directors' functions respecting the advisory contract:
Under the Act no adviser may serve a fund except pursuant to written
contract.7 4 Every contract, or such change therein as creates a new contract,
must be approved by vote of the holders of a majority of outstanding fund
shares.7 r No contract may last more than two years unless renewed at least
annually by shareholders as a class or by the directors, including a majority
71. See, e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940 § 25, 54 Stat. 826 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§80a-25 (1958).
72. See McCoRmicx, op. cit. supra note 56, at 152.
73. See Association of Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors, "The Origin and History of the
Contractual Plan," p. 16 (1960). An interesting reflection on this withdrawal privilege is
the fate of a proposal of the SEC staff more than a decade ago to amend the Securities
Act of 1933 to give the purchaser of newly underwritten corporate securities forty-eight
hours in which to withdraw after having the prospectus made available to him. Repre-
sentatives of the investment banking industry resisted this interruption in the normal flow
of commitments and the proposal was never adopted. See discussion of the "out" clause in
Lobell, Revision of the Securities Act, 48 CoLum. L. Rzv. 313, 331-32 (1948).
74. See note 27 supra.
75. Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)
(1958). The requirement of shareholder approval of contract changes is a derivative of
the broad requirement of § 15(a) that the "contract" be "approved by the vote of a majority
of the outstanding voting securities."
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of directors having no affiliation with the adviser.76 An assignment of the
advisory contract by the adviser voids the contract. 77 Shareholders as a class,
or directors, may at any time cancel a contract on 60 days notice and without
penalty.78 Directors may recommend a substitute adviser for one serving the
fund, but they cannot approve a substitute. The approval of a substitute is a
matter exclusively within the purview of shareholders acting as a class.
79
Directors may recommend a change in the fee or in any other term of the con-
tract. But these, too, cannot be adopted without approval of shareholders act-
ing as a class.
The statute, it should be observed, departs from the typical corporate model
in these prescriptions. Directors of a typical corporation are not only permitted
but are expected to use their own judgment and discretion in hiring, firing
and compensating management personnel. In the mutual fund, however, the
statute creates a unique division of hiring, firing and compensation respon-
sibilities 1) by permitting directors to fire an adviser without referral to share-
holders, but requiring shareholder approval of any replacement; and 2) by
requiring shareholder approval of any fee or any change in the fee.
The apparent oddity of this scheme disappears when we view it in the light
of the doctrine of mandated responsibilities as applied to the mutual fund
situation. If an adviser is creating an urgent possibility of critical damage to
the fund, the directors may need the power of cancellation. However, the
statute, through this scheme of severing from directors functions normally
vested in them, through provisions giving a strong position to the adviser on
the board of the fund,80 through provisions against assignment of advisory
contracts, 81 and through the requirements of disclosure about the adviser,
recognizes the close link between the adviser and the shareholder, the signifi-
cance of the adviser's identity in the shareholder's choice of the fund shares
and the reliance of the shareholder on the adviser for the essential function of
investment management.8 2 It should not be considered as strange, therefore,
76. Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 15(a) (2), 15(c), 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(a) (2), -15(c) (1958).
77. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(a) (4), 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-15 (a) (4) (1958). For a discussion of some of the implications of this requirement
see Lobell at n.58, and 212.
78. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(a) (3), 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§80a-15 (a) (3) (1958).
79. This, too, is a derivative of the requirement of § 15 (a) that no adviser may serve,
except under a contract approved by holders of a majority of voting shares.
80.. .Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10, 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10
(1958). In effect this section permits the adviser to be represented by at least 4 and as many
as 9 affiliates on the fund board of ten members. See Lobell at 207-11.
81. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(a) (4), 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-15 (a) (4) (1958).
82. See testimony of David Schenker, counsel to SEC's Investment Trust Study. In
referring to the change made in the original bill (so as to allow a majority of boards in
certain cases to contain a majority affiliated with the adviser), Mr. Schenker stated:
The bill as originally introduced had a different provision. It required that a majority
of the board be independent of the management. However, the argument was made
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that the statute retains for the shareholders, as distinguished from the direc-
tors, the dispositive function of approving or disapproving the selection of an
investment adviser and of the terms of his service.83
This is a key fact about the Act, and typical of the approach and aim of its
drafters. While they could not, in prescribing standards, be wholly indifferent
to the legal form assumed by the fund," the drafters came as close to that
approach as possible. Their conceptual model was neither the corporate stereo-
type on the one hand nor the business trust on the other (these being the prin-
ciple forms assumed by funds) but a relation of stewardship whose attributes
were to be preserved whatever form the fund took. The prime factors in the
stewardship, as the drafters conceived it, were the investor and the adviser.
If a fund was in trust form without a board of trustees (or "directors" within
the meaning of the statute), it was not required to change its structure to
include such a board. In this type of fund the relation between shareholder
and adviser remains, in structure as well as in intent, direct and unmediated
by a board of any kind.
It is against this background that the functions of the board of directors
with respect to the adviser must be viewed. Under the statute the board has
the option of passing on annual advisory contract renewals or of remitting the
question to shareholders as a class. They, as well as the shareholders as a
class, have the power to initiate a cancellation of the contract at any time on
that it is difficult for a person or firm to undertake the management of an invest-
ment company, give advice, when the majority of the board may repudiate that
advice. It was urged that if a person is buying management of a particular person
and if the majority of the board may repudiate his advice, then, in effect, you are
depriving the stockholders of that person's advice. Now that made sense to us. If
the stockholders want A's management, then A should have the right to impose his
investment advice on that company.
Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
83. The power of shareholders, as a class, to approve or disapprove an adviser is in
addition to their power as individuals to accept or reject the adviser's service both in their
original consideration whether or not to purchase the fund's shares and in their exercise
or failure to exercise their rights of redemption. A shareholder, who of course accepted
the shares originally, is free to vote against the adviser. Barring material changes in cir-
cumstance such adverse votes are likely to be, and have in fact been, small in number-
even in the face of opposition to the adviser. A recent shareholder proposal to cancel an
investment advisory contract of a fund received 7 million favorable votes out of 111 million
shares voting. See Wall Street Journal, April 6i-'1961, p. 2.
84. Special provisions of § 16(b) making exceptions to the usual proxy and voting
procedure for funds in trust form in existence prior to 1940 were urged on the Congress in
part because of the possibility that under the laws of certain states, shareholders of fund
trusts, with voting power, might be liable for debts incurred by the trustee in his official
capacity. Hearings on S. 3580, part 2, Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 590-95 (1940).
See also § 15(c), which provides for approval of advisory and underwriting contracts
by unaffiliated directors only in funds "having a board of directors." Investment Company
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1958).
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60 days notice. However, the statute does not state what occasions are and
are not proper for a veto or cancellation by directors. Those standards must
be derived from other provisions of the Act and relevant law and must be con-
sistent with the Act's general pattern and purpose. To be indifferent to either,
in filling the gap, may lead one into the error of reshaping the hole in a jig-
saw puzzle to accommodate a foreign piece.
Certain occasions for a veto or termination are obvious. Dishonesty of the
adviser, his rank departure from risk levels associated with the fund's tradi-
tional policy, his failure to maintain a level of professional competence in fund
management-malpractice in carrying out any of the vital functions falling
within the scope of mandated responsibilities, would under any circumstances,
with or without statute, seem to justify contract termination. These are func-
tions which the shareholder cannot himself oversee; they are peculiar to the
internal, operational aspects of fund management. An adviser who is guilty
of malpractice in carrying out these functions belies the legitimate expectations
and understandings motivating investors to entrust their money in the fund.
Such practices are, in a real sense, a failure of the trust through acts which
the shareholder cannot himself detect until after the harm is done. To over-
see the operations of the fund for the purpose of detecting and stopping such
practices is clearly within the scope of mandated responsibilities of directors
and, in appropriate cases, one has no difficulty in concluding that liabilities
may follow.
Does the Act, however, create an obligation in directors to terminate con-
tracts on grounds which are not mandated responsibilities? Suppose, in the
judgment of directors a fund is losing possibilities of gain in a rising market
by maintaining its practice of investing only in common stocks of established
companies rather than in more speculative issues, and the directors urge the
adviser to adopt a change which, though not "fundamental" within the mean-
ing of Section 13 of the Act (requiring approval of shareholders), would
materially change the risk level traditionally associated with the fund. Are they
warranted in vetoing or cancelling the contract because of this type of differ-
ence of opinion with the adviser? One would think not. The risk level asso-
ciated with the fund (whether or not part of the fund's "fundamental" policy
as defined by statute) was apparent to investors in their original selection
of the fund's shares. The fund they chose was managed by an adviser who
operated according to that policy; no critical problem of conserving assets in
the face of imminent danger is presented; and to assume even freedom (much
less responsibility) in the directors to fire the adviser because he insists on
continuing with the policy would be to assume that directors may remake the
essential aspects of the arrangement the shareholder thought he was making
when he bought the fund shares.
Suppose that directors have no difference of judgment with the adviser as
to any aspect of the advisers' operations but are offered the services of another
adviser willing to work for a lower fee. Are they free, on the ground of the
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rate of the fee alone, to fire the adviser? Are they responsible if they do not?
Are they obligated affirmatively to dicker with an adviser over his fee, and,
if the dicker fails, to fire him? To vest responsibility for these functions in
directors again implies that directors are not only free but obligated to remake
the arrangement the shareholder thought he was making when he bought the
fund shares. A director might conceivably assume that investment manage-
ment skill is a fungible commodity, that one adviser is as good as another,
and the cheaper the better. But investors are not presumed to feel that way.
As we have noted, the law prescribes requirements of disclosure, and me-
chanics of advisory contract approval-giving only shareholders the power to
approve the selection of an adviser and the fixing of his fee-which make no
sense unless the responsibility of the investor in the choice of his adviser and
of the adviser's terms of service were deemed to be one of the prime elements
in his choice of the fund.
Dicta at variance with this view are expressed in Brown v. Bullock.8 5 Since
it is the first decision dealing with issues being raised in many similar cases,88
and formulates at length the basis for its conclusions, the language of the
opinion as well as the narrow issues decided merit extended comment. It
should be noted at the outset that the court in the Brown case was passing
on a motion to dismiss a complaint-and not on the merits. Further, the court
dealt with the issues as posed, and these did not include the notions of division
of responsibility here discussed or of the unique nature of the fund or the
unique provisions of statute as they bear on the division of responsibilities.
The Brown case was a mutual fund shareholders' action naming as defend-
ants the adviser and directors of the fund. The complaint alleged that the
adviser (who is also principal underwriter) dominated the unaffiliated direc-
tors of the fund; that the advisory fee was exorbitant ;87 that the sales charge
was exorbitant; that both the advisory fee and sales charge were harmful to
the fund, were a waste and spoliation of fund assets and constituted wilful
conversion and gross negligence and abuse of trust. In addition, it was alleged
that proxy statements used to solicit votes for the election of directors were
false in that they failed to reveal that the adviser had other funds under man-
agement at fee rates lower than those fixed by contract with the instant fund.
In all, violations of eight sections of the Investment Company Act were al-
leged.88
85. Civil No. 60-3106, S.D.N.Y., March 9, 1961.
86. See note 2 supra.
87. The advisory fee involved in Brown v. Bullock was Y of 1% of assets up to $100
million and % of 1% on all thereafter. Since the Fund's assets stood at close to $300
million, the overall fee was roughly 3/10 of 1%. As we have observed in the majority
of funds, the fee is '1 of 1%. See note 37 supra.
88. These included: § 15(a) (3), providing for cancellation of advisory contracts on
60 days notice, 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (3) (1958) ; § 17(h), barring
clauses exculpating directors from "willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reck-
less disregard" of duties, 54 Stat. 815 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (1958); § 17(i)
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Defendants moved to dismiss on grounds that statutory violations do not
give rise to private causes of action under the Investment Company Act and
that even if they did, no causes of action were alleged because the conduct
alleged did not constitute violations. The motion was denied. Beyond several
references to the possibilities of management abuse inherent in funds the
opinion is devoid of any discussion of the unique character of the fund. The
function of the mutual fund, as a vehicle for rendering investment advisory
services, was neither considered nor evaluated in the court's interpretation of
the law and its objectives. The conceptual model presupposed in the court's
opinion was apparently the typical corporate model, assuming responsibility
in the director to terminate or veto a contract on any ground on which one
may make a judgment with respect to the contract, including the compensation
involved, and ignoring the question whether some of these judgments might
not be exclusively within the purview of shareholders rather than of directors.
The opinion illustrates a high sensitivity to the fiduciary nature of fund
management responsibilities and an extreme reluctance to interpret the Act
in any but the broadest possible terms-presumably for fear that any narrow-
ing of interpretation might leave chinks in the structure through which un-
known dangers might slip.""
Noting that the Investment Company Act gives directors the power to veto
a contract renewal or to cancel it on notice, the Court said:
The directors are thus charged by the Act with critically important
powers and duties of a specific nature .... The grant of these defined 90
powers, as specified in the Act, carries with it the duty to determine
whether or not the extension is desirable and in the best interest of the
company. The power to terminate the investment advisory contract neces-
sarily carries with it the duty to keep alert for reasons which might make
providing similar bars for advisers and underwriters, 54 Stat. 815 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
17(i) (1958); § 20(a) making it unlawful to solicit proxies in violation of SEC rules,
54 Stat. 822 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a) (1958); § 34(b) making it unlawful to file
false reports, 54 Stat. 840 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (1958) ; § 36, giving SEC power
to seek injunctions against gross misconduct and gross abuse of trust, 54 Stat. 841 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1958) ; § 37, outlawing wilful conversion and other crimes of abstract-
ing property, 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1958) ; § 44, giving courts juris-
diction of suits, 54 Stat. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1958) and § 47(b) voiding con-
tracts in violation of the Act, 54 Stat. 846 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b) (1958).
The court, finding the complaint sufficient in its allegations of a violation of § 37 arising
out of the advisory fee, did not pass on the question of the sales charge. Civil No. 60-3106,
S.D.N.Y., March 9, 1961, pp. 36-37.
89. Hence statements expressing fear of "emasculating" the Act, the search for fidu-
ciary standards in the Act "regardless of their foundation in the common law," the refer-
ence to the "law-enforcement" aspects of private litigation based on statutory violations
in the "light of the distinctive character of investment companies and their easy suscepti-
bility to management abuses . . .both crude and subtle." Civil No. 60-3106, S.D.N.Y.,
March 9,1961, pp. 53, 37, 43.
90. The court does not mean the word "defined" here to signify that the Act "defines"
the occasions for exercise of directors' power of veto or termination. It is the absence of
such definition which gives rise to the problem of interpretation.
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termination necessary or desirable; and, in the presence of such reasons,
to exercise the right of termination. The objectives of the Act would be
nullified if the directors were free to extend mechanically the contract
without honestly exercising their best judgment. The objectives of the
Act would be equally frustrated if the directors were free to close their
eyes to any developments making the termination of the contract advis
able. 91
Into the gap left by the Act (in its failure to specify the occasions for a
director's veto or cancellation of a contract) the court infuses the broadest
possible range of standards. Directors must affirmatively decide that the con-
tract is "desirable" and "in the best interest of the company." 92 In an "honest"
exercise of their "best judgment" they must be alert "for reasons making a
termination necessary or desirable."
Were the complaint one which alleged facts bearing on breaches of respon-
sibility that could reasonably be allocated to any section of the fund manage-
ment complex the courts' language, though broad, would be apt. However,
behind the conclusory allegations of the complaint is the simple claim that the
advisory fee is too high. If the plaintiff were a client of a private adviser
making a similar complaint against the adviser, the court would presumably
make short shrift of it. Having accepted the terms of the adviser's service,
the investor either pays the fee or withdraws his account. The court will not
reform his arrangement for him-although it will be vigilant to undo any harm
done by the adviser in failing to carry through a mandated responsibility.93
And, further, none of the court's language referring to directors could have
any application to a case involving a mutual fund which is not a corporation
and has no board of directors or trustees.
Thus, if one works toward the fund from the conceptual model of the pri-
vate client-counsellor relationship, through the model of a fund without a
board, logic compels one to ask why the existence of a board of directors
should transform a clear investor responsibility (to accept or reject the terms
of service) into a directors' responsibility (to remake the terms of service).
91. Civil No. 60-3106, S.D.N.Y., March 9, 1961.
92. The very use of the term "company" in this context reveals the court's carry over,
to this special field, of concepts from the general storehouse of corporate analogies. The
"best interests of the company" are irrelevant to the best interests of fund shareholders,
if the "company" be assumed to have any existence apart from the cluster of relations in-
herent in it. A fund growing in size is not necessarily increasing shareholders' asset value.
A conservative fund may not be making as much profit as a speculative one. The "best"
judgment of directors may dictate that it would be "desirable" to change the risk level of
the fund-but that judgment would be irrelevant to either their freedom or responsibility
to remake the fund into something other than what shareholders believed they were pur-
chasing. That courts are led into error of this kind by reasoning like that in Brown v. Bul-
lock is obvious from Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960).
See Lobell 181, 192-96.
93. See Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 795 (1946) ; Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 266, 272-81 (1959).
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Unless specifically compelled by statute to do so, to hinge consequences on the
existence or nonexistence of a board is to lose touch both with the purpose
and pattern of the statute and with the ethical predicates which we have here
explored. The court, however, did not work up from the client-counsellor
model (which is in fact the anchor of the fund in its tradition of stewardship)
but worked down from the typical corporate model. In doing so, it ignored
the pointed indications in common understanding and in the Act and its legis-
lative history that the adviser, his fee, and his policy are terms of the fund
relationship accepted by the investor and that, however broadly one may con-
strue the responsibilities of directors as overseers of the fund's operations, those
responsibilities do not embrace a duty in the director to substitute himself for
the shareholder in matters of judgment crucial to the shareholder in his orig-
inal determination whether or not to accept the adviser and the terms of his
service.
One feels that the court was asking: "If the directors are not responsible
for independent judgment in reviewing every aspect of an advisory contract,
including the fee, who is ?" The court's analysis does not recognize a division
of responsibility between shareholder and director. Without a sufficient dia-
lectic based on the nature of Mr. Smith's relations with his adviser through
the fund, or a view of the Act as a whole and its intention to legislate in the
light of those relations, the court's reluctance to draw any line of division in
responsibilities was understandable. In doing so, however, it gave Mr. Smith
a windfall which neither he nor those responsible for his protection anticipated.
It freed him from his own bargain by vesting in others the duty of remaking
that bargain for him. Mr. Smith may well pause before picking up this wind-
fall. For he runs the danger that if his bargain may be remade to lower the
fee he accepted, it might also be remade to change other terms of his arrange-
ment in a manner or for a purpose he may regard as onerous or unsuited to
himself.9"
A more recent related decision-that of Delaware Chancellor Seitz in
Meiselman v. Eberstadt 95-dealt with a complaint in substance similar to that
in the Brown case and dismissed the complaint on the merits after trial. Plain-
tiffs made the interesting assertion that the compensation of a fund officer or
director affiliated with the adviser is to be measured by his personal share in
the advisers' revenues and contended that the compensation, so measured, was
excessive in the particular case. The Chancellor refused to find the compen-
sation excessive, although he thought it on the high side as compared with
that of other fund executives. He gave great weight to the fact that unaffiliated
directors had annually approved the fee (which, like that in the Brown case,
was lower than the average for mutual funds) and that within recent years
shareholders as a class had done so. The provisions of the Investment Com-
pany Act were neither pleaded nor dealt with in the opinion. The unique
94. See Lobell 192-96.
95. 170 A.2d 720 (Del. 1961).
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nature of the fund, the division of responsibilities in the fund, and the impact
of the Investment Company Act were neither argued nor decided.
These issues, though not packaged for decision by counsel, were neverthe-
less inherent in the Chancellor's reasoning-which hinged on the premise that
fiduciaries "of course, may not pay themselves excessive compensation." While
thoroughly applicable as a basis of judicial scrutiny of fees of guardians, testa-
mentary trustees, receivers and others similarly imposed on the cestuis, there
is considerable question whether the doctrine is equally applicable to fund
advisers in the context of disclosure and of the unique nature and structure
of funds. The formula urged by plaintiff and not attacked by defendants-
that of stepping over a fee competitively appealing to and accepted by thou-
sands of investors to get to the shares in the advisory company's revenues of
individual officers and directors of the fund-seems in itself to be a fluctuating
benchmark, one that may depend on the accidents of distribution of owner-
ship within the advisory company. In the Meiselman case, however, it was a
natural corollary of the unexplored premise of the case: that no consideration
is to be given to the role of the investor in deciding whether or not to accept
the adviser at his disclosed terms. This is a characteristic of all the cases dis-
cussed in this article, one that stems from the approach of counsel themselves
to the fund institution.
b. Catch-all provisions of the Act:
We have thus far not commented on two key provisions of the Investment
Company Act: Section 36 which empowers the SEC to seek injunctions
against "gross misconduct" and "gross abuse of trust" by fund directors and
advisers, and Section 37 which makes it a crime to steal, unlawfully abstract,
unlawfully and wilfully convert, or embezzle fund assets.
It has hitherto been assumed that both these sections are funnels, means of
infusing into the statute the judge-made precedents we call "common law"
to cover wider ranges of duties than a statute could conveniently list individ-
ually.90 There is ground for believing that they will now be regarded as gen-
eral rubrics, embodying not only the common law prescriptions but those
which can be fairly derived from other and more specific sections of the ActY7
However one reads them, these sections do not, by themselves, specify pre-
cise standards of conduct in precise situations. Regarded as conduits of the
96. See Greene, supra note 93, at 269-72. The same reasoning applies to §§ 17(h) and
(j) which ban clauses exculpating officers, directors and advisers from liability by reason
of "willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence, or reckless disregard of the duties in-
volved in the conduct of office." Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 817, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-17(h) & (j) (1958).
97. This is the minimal interpretation that can be given to the court's statement in
Brown v. Bullock that
The federal sanctions were not placed in ... section 36 for the sole purpose of en-
forcing exclusively State-created duties as prescribed and defined in multitudinous
State corporation laws and their interpretive decisions. The more reasonable view
is that the main purpose for placing these elaborate and detailed federal sanctions in
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common law they remit one, as any general statement of fiduciary obligation
does, to a closer inspection of the claims asserted in the light of the sense of
the law, to determine whether the claim is enforceable. The claim that a fee is
exorbitant has little merit when asserted by a shareholder who accepted the
same fee when he bought his shares originally and alleges no grounds for
concluding that the fee is any more onerous to him now than it was then.
Regarded as repetitive of other and more specific statutory requirements, these
sections remit us back to a statute which neither in terms nor in discemable
intention places a responsibility on anyone but the investor to decide whether
an advisory fee should be paid."
Thus, again, to predicate a liability under Section 37 or 36 remits one to
the sources of fiduciary obligation to find whether an alleged "conversion" or
"gross abuse" is founded on any conduct which could constitute violation of
duty.
How did the court approach this problem in Brown v. Bullock? In urging
dismissal of the complaint defendants argued that the Investment Company
Act does not regulate fees and that therefore no cause of action based on a
complaint about fees can be grounded on an alleged violation of the Act. The
court dismissed this argument as "beside the point" and said:
The absence of mechanical statutory limits for the fees or commission does
not prevent the application of Section 37 once its factual prerequisites are
shown to exist. The size of the payments received by defendants is only
an evidentiary, not an operative fact. The size of the payments considered
together with other material and evidentiary circumstances (such as the
use of false and misleading statements, collusion, the relationship of the
size of payments to the value of the services allegedly rendered) may
establish the ultimate fact of deliberate appropriations and the conclusion
of willful conversion."9
The pleading which, according to the court, sufficiently alleged the "factual
prerequisites" of an inquiry into the "other material and evidentiary circum-
stances" was a set of conclusory allegations to the effect that the fee was
this regulatory Act was to enforce compliance with the Act and the performance of
the duties imposed by the Act.
Civil No. 60-3106, S.D.N.Y., March 9, 1961, p. 53 (emphasis supplied).
In a note to this statement the court says, in apparent second-thought, that "section 36
was a reservoir of fiduciary obligations imposed on affiliated persons to prevent gross mis-
conduct or gross abuse of trust not otherwise specifically dealt with in the Act." Id. at 54.
One senses in the court's first statement above that it was perhaps reaching fpr a "code"
self-contained in the Investment Company Act warranting a new departure in basic fiduciary
doctrine. This is reinforced by the court's reference to fiduciary standards in the Act "re-
gardless of their foundation in the common law."
98. We feel that [the level of the advisory fee] is a question for stockholders to decide.
If they want to pay a man a million dollars to manage the fund and if they know
they are paying him a million dollars ... this bill says that is perfectly all right.
Testimony of David Schenker, Senate Hearings on S. 3580, stpra note 84, at 252.
99. Civil No. 60-3106, S.D.N.Y., March 9, 1961.
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exorbitant, the directors were dominated by the adviser and that the sum of
their delinquency was a wilful conversion and gross abuse of trust. We are not
concerned here with the court's view of what constitutes good federal pleading,
but with some of the consequences of holding that this type of pleading may
provoke a court's inquiry into the other "material and evidentiary" circum-
stances. Although incidental to the main theme of this article, these circum-
stances bear discussion.
1. False and Misleading Statements. The complaint alleged that proxy
statements used in the solicitation of votes for directors were false and mis-
leading. These allegations were particularized to complain that while the proxy
statement stated the adviser's contract with the fund to be "similar" to other
contracts between the adviser and the other funds, it was not disclosed that
the adviser was serving other funds than the instant one at lower aggregate
fees. To hold this "failure of disclosure" material is to assume the answer to
the main question of the case. How much the adviser charges in the manage-
ment of other funds is relevant to the question whether a director is or is not
qualified for office only if one assumes a legal obligation in the director to get
the lowest possible fee.' 00 However, "no fund director (or any other director)
can be expected to buy cheaper that which only experience can show to have
been bought well at any price."'10
2. Lack of Independence. Whether or not a director is independent is an
important fact about him. But whether an alleged lack of independence can
ground a complaint depends on whether one can trace a justifiable wrong to
the lack of independence. There is no doubt, for example, that a shareholder
may not be heard to complain that a director failed to fire an adviser of a
bond fund because more money could have been made by converting it into
a stock fund. Nor could such a complaint be made legally sufficient by alleg-
fng that the director who failed in his alleged duty to fire the adviser did so
100. It is at this point that most lawyers pause-for the text seems to assume that
there are no conditions in which the size of a fee can give rise to a problem for directors.
This is not so. A fee rate may be so high as to make it doubtful that the fund could achieve
its investment objectives. If so, the fee is a built-in aspect of the fund that frustrates the
very purpose of the trust. An adviser or a director taking a position in such a fund, or a
director of a fund whose adviser is demanding an increase in fee to such a level runs the
risk of being charged with participating in a venture so hopeless as to be beyond legitimi-
zation by disclosure-for ipso facto only those unable to protect themselves in entry into
a contractual arrangement would purchase or retain the shares. The prevailing range of
advisory fees in mutual funds is not an arbitrarily determined one. Its extremes of high
and low are set to fix a range in which fund management costs are reasonably related to
possible investment results, and are substantially lower than costs in other types of port-
folio management. A court faced with pleading like that in Brown v. Bullock could insist
on particularization which will tell it what the fee in the particular case is and where it
falls within the prevalent range of fees. If it chooses not to make this a matter of pleading,
it may take judicial notice of the same facts. What the prevailing range of fees is, where
the fee in any fund before the court falls within the range are matters widely published,
and indisputable-and would, therefore, seem to be proper matters for judicial notice.
101. Lobell 207.
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because he was beholden to the adviser. Thus, the "evidentiary circumstance"
of lack of independence in directors is not material unless it results in acts
which, for other legal reasons, can properly ground a complaint. To treat it
otherwise is to endow it with qualities of self-levitation.
3. The Worth of the Services. Among the "related evidentiary circum-
stances" which the court considered material to an inquiry into "willfull con-
version" is "the relationship of the size of payments to the value of the ser-
vices allegedly rendered." This parenthetical remark of the court is potentially
the most far reaching element of its opinion. It may be taken for granted, in
view of the court's rulings on the pleading in Brown v. Bullock, that every
complaint that comes before it will contain the verbal formula which the court
has deemed adequate to stand against a motion to dismiss. Thus every case
might be postured so as to make the court an agency of review of the worth
of advisory services in mutual funds.
This is an awesome task for any court to assume (even if it were to be
granted that it is at all a matter of judicial concern). No plaintiff need ever
fear that a court will raise an advisory fee. It is for the defendant to fear that
any fee, no matter how low, may involve him in charges of wilful conversion
which will subject the fee to judicial scrutiny beyond that of the market place
and of the investors' acceptance .1
2
Of some 250 mutual funds in existence there are very few that do not have
advisory contracts with an advisory house. The rest operate under advisory
102. It is to avoid just this sort of danger that courts have often insisted that
The dissenting shareholder should.., have more than a claim based on mere differ-
ences of opinion upon the question whether equal services could have been secured
for somewhat less.
Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 464-65, 189 N.W. 586, 588 (1922).
Directors could refuse to pass on contract renewals and remit this question, as they may
under § 15, to the shareholders of the fund. This affords a dubious protection under the
broad language of Brown v. Bullock. For the assent of the shareholder to a fee expressed
in his initial purchase of the shares did not, according to the opinion, immunize directors
from responsibility for reviewing the fee to determine whether to cancel the contract on
60 days notice. And, in addition, the opinion holds the complaint sufficient even though it
alleges no material changes in circumstances since plaintiffs' acquisition of their shares.
Directors could insist on competitive bidding for fund advisory contracts. But they run the
danger of being deemed insurers of any cheaper replacement they recommend solely because
it is cheaper. And if the replacement adviser still manages to make a profit at the lower
fee, the profit is a danger to directors; for any profit can be cut. Further, since only share-
holders as a class can approve a replacement adviser, every attempt of directors to replace
an adviser is an occasion for proxy solicitation and an invitation to proxy warfare with the
traditional adviser anxious to maintain his traditional relationship with the fund. The
absurd result is, as the author has previously noted, to resubmit to shareholders who chose
the adviser originally in their purchase of shares the question whether the adviser should
continue to serve (whether or not there have been any material changes in circumstances)
and, ironically, to face the very high probability that the traditional adviser will keep that
position. Thus, through wasteful, expensive and fund shattering warfare, the directors, to
fulfill imputed obligations, will have taken steps which bring them full circle back to their
starting point. Lobell 205.
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contracts 10 -- a traditional method of operation which antedated the passage
of the Investment Company Act.10 4 One of the specific issues faced in the draft-
ing of that Act was whether this method of operation should be continued or
banned. The decision to continue it, and to hedge it with appropriate protective
conditions, was deliberate: °'
As the legislative history shows, the planners of the legislation were well
aware that in its formative period a fund cannot financially afford competent
personnel. It must be endowed with services for which it cannot hope to repay
until it grows large enough to support itself and, with a reasonable fee, afford
some profit to its sponsors. Thus the choice, in the vast majority of cases,
is not whether to have an advisory contract, or a paid staff, but whether to
have a fund at all. One cannot conceive of competent men undertaking the
expense of forming funds and nursing them through their growth periods
without hope of eventual recompensation, and if successful, eventual profits.'0 6
Yet those very profits are transformed, by the reasoning of both Brown v.
Bullock and Meisehnan v. Eberstadt, into a danger zone which one enters at
the risk of review by a court which has undertaken the function of economic
arbiter.
103. See Investment Dealers Digest-Annual Fund Review, Aug. 15, 1960.
104. See note 105 in!ra.
105. See Testimony of David Schenker, Senate Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 84, at
252-testimony which reveals that, despite currents of feeling among the planners of the
regulatory scheme and the drafters of the Act that there might be other alternatives to the
advisory contract as a method of procuring management services for a mutual fund, the
advisory contract would not be eliminated, but would be hedged with the appropriate pro-
tections now appearing in the Act. Mr. Schenker said,
People down in the Street have told me-people who control investment trusts [pre-
sumably referring to the then popular closed-end type of company as distinguished
from mutual funds]. Why should this be any different from any other financial in-
stitution? They ought to have paid officers and paid directors.
Well that presented theoretically, at least, a potent argument. However, we made a
detailed study of the industry. We found that although when you get into the large
companies, they could afford to pay salaries of such size as to attract competent
people and people with ability, on the other hand, when you get dovn to the smaller
companies, in their cases, if you started paying salaries, those salaries would eat up
all the ordinary income and all the profits.
So you had this situation: Should you abolish management contracts and say
"Paid officers and directors"? Should you try to differentiate between large-sized
companies and small sized companies?
Well, the Commission felt that under the circumstances if there were a few
elementary safeguards set up with respect to management contracts, they could see
no difficulty with that situation.
I know that this is not in accord with the views of many people in the Street....
However, we said, "If the industry feels that the practice is indigenous to that type
of institution, we may have some difficulty with it, but we would not recommend to
this committee that the status be disturbed I"
106. See Testimony of Hugh W. Long before the Senate Subcommittee on S. 3580,
supra note 84, part 2, at 587.
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As the statute's proponents saw the problem, the need for regulation grew
not out of the fact that funds were managed under contract rather than by
internal personnel, but out of the highly fiduciary nature of the fund relation-
ship and the need for provisions which would embody fiduciary standards in
the handling of other people's money-in whatever form it was done.o 7 Fee
rates higher than those involved in Brown v. Bullock and Meiselnan v. Eber-
stadt were common 10 8 and the attitude of the drafters towards fees was, not
to regulate them, but to leave them to the weathering of disclosure and com-
petition for investors' patronage. 0 9
To alter a legislative philosophy so basic is, in our system, commonly re-
garded as a legislative and not a judicial function. Although the impact of their
language is in that direction, the courts nowhere express any intention to
remake the basic policy of the Investment Company Act or the structure of
the institution. They may not have been aware of the possible consequences-
to the meaning of the statute and the future of the institution regulated--of
conclusions which in other contexts might be normal derivatives of normal
expectations and assumptions.
A PARALLEL OPPosITE
An interesting companion piece to Brown v. Bullock is Brouk v. Managed
Funds, Inc.," 0 decided in January, 1961 by the Eighth Circuit. Despite the
fact that the cases are in stark conflict in their approach to the problem of
directors' liabilities both, in the author's view, illustrate the fallacy of using
the typical corporate model as the conceptual basis for decisions affecting fund
directors.
The Brouk case was a chapter in a story that began with an SEC in-
vestigation into malpractice of management leading to an extremely rare sanc-
tion-a stop order issued against a mutual fund."' The long-standing adviser
107. It is instructive that of a 1,200 page volume (Part Three, Volume I) of the
SEC's report on its study of investment companies, dealing with "Abuses and Deficiencies
in the Organization and Operation of Investment Companies" (1940) only 50 pages were
devoted specifically to the mutual fund (as distinguished from other types of investment
companies) and in none of these is there contained any criticism of advisory contracts as
methods of procuring investment service for the mutual fund, or of advisory fees. In Part
Three, Chapter VII, management costs are treated in relation to size of the company. It
is there shown that smaller companies cannot afford competent management unless they
are endowed with such management. (pp. 2489-97).
108. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3580, supra note 84, Part 2, at 707.
109. See notes 82 and 98 sipra.
110. 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961).
111. Managed Funds, Incorporated (SEC) Securities Act Release No. 4122, July 30,
1959. The "stop-order" is a sanction provided for in § 8(d) of the Securities Act of 1933,
48 Stat. 79 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1958) which empowers the Com-
mission, after notice and opportunity for hearing, to terminate the effectiveness of a regis-




of the fund resigned under fire from the SEC11- and a battle between two
competing replacement advisers led to a proxy fight.113 The complaints in the
Brouk case alleged that the adviser had employed a partner of a New York
brokerage firm as investment counsellor and manager of the Fund's portfolio
under a 10-year contract calling for an aggregate of $425,000 of salary to be
applied against the brokerage commission channeled to the "counsellor"; that
within a few years $1.5 million of brokerage fees were channeled to the coun-
sellor's firm; that the brokerage house paid $50,000 a year for no apparent
services to two associates of the adviser, one of them a director of the Fund
and the other a relative of the principals in the advisory company; that the
retaining of the "counsellor" was an act of delegation of duties of the adviser
to another not under contract with the fund as required by statute; that a
practice of paying predetermined periodic capital gains distributions resulted
in a departure from the fund's investment policy, created excessive portfolio
activity resulting in increased brokerage business channeled to the counsellor's
firm and to persons who had rendered service to principals of the adviser.114
Violations of various provisions of the Investment Company Act and of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 were alleged.115
The court devotes all but a few sentences of its opinion to whether privately
asserted liabilities of directors may be predicated on violations of the Invest-
ment Company Act. It concludes that private causes of action do not arise from
such violations. Except for a review of cases cited in contending briefs, the
court reinforces its conclusion simply by noting that "the Investment Company
and Advisers Acts neither make any definition of the duties of directors nor
provide anywhere that a registered investment company may sue its direc-
tors."1
1
Recognizing that the doctrine of "implied liability"11 7 has been employed
under securities statutes in suits between buyers and sellers of securities, the
court rejects the doctrine as applied to directors' liabilities. Its sole reference
112. See SEC Litigation Release No. 1786, September 27, 1960 (announcing the in-
junction issued by the District Court against the adviser to prevent it and its principals
from serving as advisers for any registered investment company).
113. See Elliott, Shaken Trust, Barron's, April 4, 1960, p. 3.
114. In 1956, Managed Funds, Inc. experienced a portfolio turnover of 70%, in 1957
the turnover was 44%, and in 1958, 97%. These figures should be compared with corre-
sponding average fund portfolio turnovers of 15.8%, 15% and 17.3% in the same respective
years. SEC Release 4122, supra note 111, at 12 and n.1.
115. These included 54 Stat. 790 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (b) (2) (1958) (general
declaration of policy) ; 54 Stat. 840 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33 (1958) (publishing and
circulating false statements) ; 54 Stat. 811 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1958) (departing
from fundamental policy with shareholder assent) ; and 54 Stat. 812 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-15(a) (1958) (serving as adviser without the contract required).
116. This language suggests that the suit could be brought in nomine the corporation
as well as through derivative action.
117. Le., the doctrine that, under certain circumstances a private right of action arises,
by implication, from the violation of a statutory provision. See generally Loss, SEcuMarrzs
REGULATION 1043-44 (1951).
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to the substantive aspects of the claims in dismissing the complaint is the
following:
At common law directors are liable to exercise due care and are not in-
surers. The complaints here seek to hold these former directors to strict
liability as insurers. The Act they rely on not only contains no such pro-
vision but plainly negates an intent to create such an innovation.
118
Thus, even treating the statutory violation allegations as surplusage, the court
deemed no facts to have been pleaded giving rise to a claim for which relief
could be granted."19
The complaint in the Brouk case, unlike that in Brown v. Bullock and the
fifty similar actions now pending in various state and federal courts, involves
claims based on aspects of fund operation which, in terms of the doctrine of
Hun v. Cary, may be deemed prima facie within the area of mandated re-
sponsibility.' 20 If the duties asserted in the Brouk case exist at all, they exist
somewhere in the adviser-director complex of the Fund.
The court presumably did not deny the existence of these duties. The
opinion is limited in its application to directors, and the complaint was dis-
missed only as it affected the unaffiliated directors of the Fund. No one can
seriously deem a fund director liable for every error, or even act of malprac-
tice by the adviser that takes place. However, whether or not the complaint
in fact seeks to make "insurers" of the directors is not discernible from the
face of the complaint.
Faced with two opposite opinions like those in the Brouk and Brown cases,
the bar may well wonder where to find its guides in this relatively new field.
The door to proof that the Brouk case closed to the plaintiffs, the Brown case
opened wide. The plaintiff in the Brouk case might have proved a failure of
duty in fund directors. The plaintiff in the Brown case could establish "con-
version" or "breach of trust" only by proving facts he never alleged 121 and
only if the court is willing to substitute itself for the market place, the in-
vestor and the director in weighing the "worth" of the advisory service. The
contrast of the two cases illustrates ironically the deficiencies in the approaches
courts have thus far taken to the modem mutual fund.122 The Brown case
upholds allegations of violation of provisions of the Act on their face endow-
ing the Commission, and the Commission only, with authority to pursue
118. 286 F.2d 901, 918 (8th Cir. 1961) (citation omitted).
119. But see Lutz v. Boaz, Civil No. 1147, Del. Ch., New Castle County, May 25, 1961.
120. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
121. This statement refers not only to the conclusory nature of the allegations in the
Brown case, but also assumes the author's view that a complaint as to an unmandated
responsibility (a term of the arrangement disclosed to and accepted by the shareholder)
cannot be made without alleging inter alia a change in circumstance so as, in effect, to
create new terms materially different from those disclosed and accepted.
122. Differences in pleading practices between federal and Delaware courts, while they
may have served to heighten the contrast, certainly cannot provide a complete explanation
for it.
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remedies.123 Allegations which were not so limited are struck down in the
Brouk case as ill-pleaded.1
2 4
Both opinions seem to presume the conceptual model of the typical corpora-
tion. While their differences in result can be attributed to the differences in
the views of the judges as to the attributes of the typical corporate model, they
illustrate, as this author views them, the fallacy of working from the wrong
model. Neither of two cars, crossing on an east-west road, is going north.
Statutory Violations and Private Causes of Action
Whether or not a violation of statute gives rise to a private cause of action
was the question occupying most of the attention of the judges in both the
Brown and Brouk cases. Their expressed views, as we have noted, are direct-
ly contrary. While only tangential to the main problem of directors' liabilities,
this issue is an important one. For it may bear not only on the scope of the
rights that can be asserted in private litigation or the court in which those
rights may be asserted, but affects vital allocations of governmental functions
as well.12
It is, however, enormously difficult to reduce the problem to manageable
size-even if limited to the Investment Company Act. For this is a field in
which what judges say may have very little to do with what they mean. With
distressing frequency judges say they are upholding complaints alleging statu-
tory violations when it seems that in fact they are simply content that the
complaint states a cause of action at common law and are merely setting up
a hook on which to hang federal jurisdiction or when (assuming diversity or
other independent ground of federal jurisdiction) the statutory pleading is
123. E.g., Section 36 of the Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35 (1958), which says that "The Commission is authorized to bring an action" to
prevent gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust. The court also cites with approval Taussig
v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960), which held a violation of
§ 35(d) properly pleaded in a private action. That section provides:
(d) It shall be unlawful for any registered investment company hereafter to adopt
as a part of the name or title of such company, or of any security of which it is the
issuer, any word or words which the Commission finds and by order declares to be
deceptive or misleading. The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the
proper district court of the United States or United States court of any Territory
or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States alleging that the name
or title of any registered investment company, or of any security which it has issued,
is materially deceptive or misleading. If the court finds that the Commission's allega-
tions in this respect, taking into consideration the history of the investment company
and the length of time which it may have used any such name or title, are established,
the court shall enjoin such investment company from continuing to use any such
name or title.
54 Stat. 840 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d) (1958) (emphasis supplied).
124. Neither §§ 33 nor 13, nor 15 expressly limit the pursuit of remedies to the Com-
mission, as do §§ 36 and 35(d).
125. See Doyle v. Milton, 73 F. Supp. 281, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
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actually surplusage.126 Sometimes, as in the Brouk case, elaborate discussions
of the issue boil down to nothing more than the mere conclusion that no vio-
lation has been alleged. One may pair together cases like Brown and Meisel-
man which deal with almost identical issues-the first case turning its reason-
ing almost wholly on questions of statute, the second never mentioning the
statute.
127
On the other hand, one may pair decisions like those in the Brown and Brouk
cases. In the first, the court seems willing to accept sweeping allegations of
statutory violation-even of provisions clearly allocating the prosecution func-
tion to a specific governmental agency (for example, section 36 of the Invest-
ment Company Act) and to open an "administered" statute to the hazards of
private litigation under varieties of theory and skil of counsel, not always
consistent, and not always bent on the statutory purpose as their ultimate
aim. In the second, the court's dicta seem to close completely the gates of
private litigation under the very same Act.
Where a statute specifically creates private causes of action, the problem
does not arise.128 It arises when a statute prescribes a duty but does not
specifically designate it to be enforceable in private litigation' 2 -- or when it
vests power to pursue remedies in one class of persons without expressly ex-
cluding others.180
The bases on which the pleading of statutory violation will be upheld have
126. In Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960), the court
entertained a pleading of violation of § 35 (d) of the Investment Company Act to bring into
play the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Thereafter the Court practically ignored the
section and turned its reasoning almost wholly on considerations of trade mark law. Typical
also is Roosevelt Field, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 84 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y.
1949) where an old fashioned nuisance was condemned under a provision of the Air Com-
merce Act of 1946 requiring notice to a federal agency of proposed construction along air-
ways. But see Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937
(1957), where the court refused to assert jurisdiction in a case lacking diversity, solely
under a pleading of violation of SEC's proxy rules.
A refreshing contrast to these cases is Dederick v. North American Co., 48 F. Supp.
410 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) which acknowledged that both the court and the SEC had jurisdiction
over certain inter-company claims in a public utility holding company system but in which
the judge, exercising his power over the court calendar, delayed consideration of the litiga-
tion before him until the administrative proceedings were over on the possibility that nothing
might be left to litigate.
127. The fact that the Meiselman case was a state court case, whereas the Brown case
was in the federal court is of little significance. Section 44 of the Investment Company Act
of 1940 confers on state courts,* concurrently with federal courts, jurisdiction of actions
under tle act. 54:'Stat. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1958).
128. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 15 and 16, 48 Stat. 82, 84, as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1, o, p (1958) ; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896,
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
129. Such, for example, are almost all the duty-prescribing provisions of the Invest-
ment Company Act.
130. See, e.g., §§ 35(d) and 36 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 840,
841, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-34(d), 80a-35 (1958).
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been variously stated.' 31 All, however, are comprehended within Loss' charac-
terization of the pattern as the "growth of the law by the interaction of legis-
lators and judges."' 2 From the tone of many of the decisions upholding the
implied right of private action for statutory violation one is led to feel that the
court, regarding itself as an agency of government, is consciously carrying
forward a legislative purpose with which it agrees and which it deems socially
important.13 3
The Brown case is a unique adventure into "interaction" not merely between
judges and legislators, but between judges and administrators-one that raises
fundamental problems in the meaning of the administrative process. The
Securities and Exchange Commission filed a memorandum as amicus curiae
in that case in support of the plaintiffs' contention that violations of statute
may give rise to private causes of action. It expressly refrained from taking
any position on the question whether the complaint stated a cause of action
(i.e. whether violations were alleged) but stated without elaboration that
It may be noted that while the Act does not undertake to regulate man-
agement fees, it does not follow that there cannot be a gross abuse of
trust with respect to fees.
The SEC's position in the Brown case has curious overtones. Whether
or not the court held that violation of statute gives rise to private causes of
action, the SEC's primary duty to enforce sections 36 and 37 continues. If
the SEC deemed that either wilful conversion or gross abuse of trust existed
in the matter, it had not only the authority but the clear duty to bring an in-
junctive action in its own name as plaintiff and perhaps to have referred the
matter to the Department of Justice for prosecution. That it never did so
because of a belief that neither section 36 nor 37 was violated seems indicated
by the fact that it has never sought to enjoin any fund or fund adviser or
director from complying with an advisory contract because the fee was too
high. It has accepted the registration statements of more than two hundred
funds, most with aggregate fees higher than those involved in the Brown case,
and has cleared thousands of prospecti disclosing higher fees. It has never
intimated that any of these prospecti was deficient for failing to reveal even
the possibility that the fee might involve a conversion or abuse of trust. It
has been aware, since before passage of the Act, that funds are formed by
131. In addition to the "void contract" and "tort" theories mentioned by Loss, op. cit.
supra note 117, at 1043-44, is a variety of policies such as "the law-enforcement aspects of
private litigation based on statutory violations." Brown v. Bullock, CivilPNo. 60-3106, 37,
S.D.N.Y., March 9, 1961. See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944) (cause of
action stated by complaint against stock exchange executives for the peculations of the
president of the exchange based on provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
requiring exchanges to adopt rules of fair dealing) (dictum).
132. Loss, op. cit. supra note 117, at 1044-45 adds "It is all a matter of 'legislative
intention.' The courts have to be sure that they are only 'finding' not 'making' the law."
133. See, e.g, Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944).
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advisers, 34 that advisers have, as they must, a dominant voice on fund boards
of directors and that directors who undertake to serve on a fund board do so
without a determination, tacit or otherwise, to destroy the relationship be-
tween the shareholder and the adviser because of a difference over the question
of fees. Nothing alleged or provable in Brown v. Bullock was either unknown
or unknowable to the SEC or unamenable to direct corrective action by it.
If the SEC accepts the philosophy of Brown v. Bullock, it confesses that
for twenty years it has misinterpreted the statute it drafted and recommended
to the Congress. If the SEC rejects the philosophy of Brown v. Bullock,
it is in the anomalous position of having, as a friend of the court, led the court
through the main gate of the litigation (the question whether violation of the
Act gives rise to a cause of action) but of having abandoned it before the dual
doors of "Cause Stated" and "Cause not Stated" allowing the court to enter
through the door which the Commission privately deems to be the wrong one.
Conclusion
The author has tried to show that at the threshold of an appraisal of share-
holder rights and directors' duties in the mutual fund one must allocate re-
sponsibilities according to 1) a conceptual model of the fund that takes into
account the unique relationship established, and the aims sought, in fund in-
vesting and 2) a willingness to go behind black letter generalizations about
duties and immunities of directors generally and to test them for their aptness
to the fund situation specifically. The prime line of allocation is between dis-
closed and accepted "term" aspects of funds (or unmandated responsibilities)
and operational aspects of funds (or mandated responsibilities). Warrant for
such division exists not only in the basic doctrine from which fiduciary obliga-
tions in freely chosen arrangements spring, but in the fundamental pattern of
the statutes applicable to the mutual fund. To fill gaps in the statute with
prescriptions foreign to this pattern distorts both the legislative intent and
underlying expectations and understandings inherent in fund investment.
134. See "Investment Trusts and Investment Companies," SEC Report on its study,
1940, part 3, p. 803.
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